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I. CONCEPTUALISATION
It certainly would be fascinating to pinpoint the time of the emergence of the notion
that certain quantum processes, such as the decay of an excited quantum state, occurs
principally and irreducibly at random; and how long it took to become the dominant way of
thinking about them after almost two centuries of quasi-rationalistic dominance. Bohr’s and
Heisenberg’s influence has been highly recognised and has prevailed, even against the strong
rationalistic and philosophic objections raised by, for instance, by Einstein and Schro¨dinger
[1, 2]. Of course, one of the strongest reasons for this growing acceptance of quantum
randomness has been the factual inability to go “beyond” the quantum in any manner
which would encourage new phenomenology and might result in any hope for a progressive
quasi-classical research program [3].
Here we intend to discuss quantum randomness and its connection with quantum value
indefiniteness. Bell [4, 5, 6, 7], Kochen and Specker (KS) [8], as well as Greenberger,
Horne and Zeilinger (GHZ) [9, 10, 11] contributed to the evidence that the mere concept of
coexistence of certain elements of physical reality [12] results in a complete contradiction.
In this view, speculations about the “reasons” for certain outcomes of experiments are
necessarily doomed; just because of the simple fact that any such rational reason is provably
(by contradiction) impossible.
An attempt is made here to clearly spell out the issues and problems involved in con-
sidering randomness, both with regard to the occurrence of single events, as well as their
combination into time series. We wish to state from the beginning that we attempt to have
no bias or preference for or against randomness. While to us it seems obvious that any claim
of non-randomness has to be confronted with the factual inability to produce any satisfac-
tory theory that goes beyond the quantum, especially in view of the known no-go theorems
by Bell, KS and GHZ and others referred to above, it is also advisable to keep all options
open and carefully study the types of randomness involved, and their possible “origins,” if
any.
Usually, the random outcome of certain quantum physical events seems to be axiomat-
ically postulated from the onset; an assumption which can be also based on elementary
principles [13, 14]. Here we argue that actually we can go further and infer some properties
of quantum randomness — including the absence of effective global correlations — from the
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impossibility of value definiteness of certain quantum mechanical observables.
A. Difficulties
Consider, as two extreme cases, the binary expansion pi1pi2pi3 . . . piipii+1 . . . of pi, an ideal
circle’s ratio of the circumference to its diameter, starting from, say, the 571113th billion
prime number place onwards, and compare it to a sequence generated by quantum coin tosses
x1x2x3 . . . xixi+1 . . . [15, 16, 17]. How could anyone possibly see a difference with respect to
their (non-)stochasticity? For all practical purposes, the sequences will appear structurally
identically from a stochastic point of view, and heuristically random. For example, both are
unknown to be Borel normal; i.e., all finite sub-sequences y1y2y3 . . . yN might be contained in
them with the expected frequencies. Indeed, it is not unreasonable to speculate that the pi
sequence might be immune to all statistical and algorithmic tests of randomness but one: a
test against the assumption that it is the binary expansion of pi, starting from the 571113th
billion prime number place onwards.
Another obstacle for the physical conceptualisation of quantum randomness and its op-
erationalisation in terms of physical entities originates in the formalism upon which such
endeavours have to be based. The formal incompleteness and independence discovered by
Go¨del, Tarski, Turing, Chaitin and others essentially renders algorithmic proofs of random-
ness hopeless. We shall discuss these issues below, but we just note that, as an example,
verification of any “law” describable by k symbols requires times exceeding any computable
function of k [such as the Ackermann function A(k)] and could in general take also that long
to be falsified. Thus, the proof of any absence of lawful behaviour seems provable impossible.
Randomness is an asymptotic property, that is, it is unaffected by finite variations. This
makes testing randomness extremely difficult: one has to find finite tests capable of distin-
guishing an infinite behaviour.
B. Scenarios
Quantum randomness appears to occur in two different scenarios: (i) the complete im-
possibility to predict or explain the occurrence of certain single events and measurement
outcomes from any kind of operational causal connection. The hidden “parameter models”
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for the quantum phenomena which have been proposed so far do not provide more insight for
the predictions of intrinsic observers embedded in the system; and (ii) the concatenation of
such single quantum random events forms sequences of random bits which can be expected
to be equivalent stochastically to white noise. White noise carries the least correlations, as
the occurrence of a particular bit value in a binary expansion does not depend on previous
or future bits of that expansion [18].
These different ways to encounter randomness — single random events and a concatena-
tion thereof — should be perceived very differently: in the single event case, the outcome
occurs in the highly complex environment of the quantum and its measurement appara-
tus, which is thereby “folded” into a single bit. Repetition of the experiment does not
increase the complexity of the combined system of the quantum–measurement apparatus,
whose repetitive properties and behaviours are “unfolded” in repeated experiments. Hence,
possible biases against statistical tests may be revealed easier by considering sequences of
single random outcomes. In this note we shall thus concentrate on this second.
C. Axioms for quantum randomness and degrees of randomness
In what follows, we will assume the standard two “axioms” for quantum randomness [19]:
• The single outcome from which quantum random sequences are formed, occurs unbi-
ased; i.e., for the ith outcome, there is a 50:50 probability for either 0 or 1:
Prob(xi = 0) = Prob(xi = 1) =
1
2
. (1)
• There is a total independence of previous history, such that no correlation exists be-
tween xi and previous or future outcomes. This means that the system carries no
memories of previous or expectations of future events. All outcomes are temporally
“isolated” and free from control, influence and determination. They are both unbiased
and self-contained.
Assume that we have a quantum experiment (using light, for example: a photon generated
by a source beamed to a semitransparent mirror is ideally reflected or transmitted with 50
per cent chance) which at each stage produces a quantum random bit, and we assume that
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this experiment is run for ever generating an infinite binary sequence:
X = x1x2x3 · · ·xi · · · (2)
In this scenario, the first axiom shows that the limiting frequency of 0 and 1 in the
sequence X is 1/2. Locally, we might record significant deviations, i.e., X may well start
with a thousand of 1’s, but in the limit these discrepancies disappear.
The “lack of correlations” postulated above is more difficult to understand and may easily
lead to misunderstandings, hence errors. First, finite correlations will always exist, because
of the asymptotic nature of “randomness”. Secondly, even infinite correlations cannot be
eliminated because they have been proven to exist in every infinite sequence; for example
Ramsey-type correlations, see [20]. So, what type of correlations should be prohibited?
There are many possible choices, but the ones which come naturally to mind are “effectively
computable defined correlations.” In other terms, correlations — finite or infinite — which
can be detected in an effective/algorithmic way, should be excluded.
Once the nature of the two axioms of randomness has been clarified, we can ask
ourselves whether we need both axioms, that is, whether the axioms are independent.
The answer is affirmative and here is the proof. An example of a binary sequence
which satisfies the first axiom, but not the second axiom is Champernowne’s sequence
0100011011000001010011 · · ·1110000 · · ·, which is just the concatenation of all binary strings
in quasi-lexicographical order. In this sequence 0 and 1 have limiting frequency 1/2 (even,
more, each string of length n has limiting frequency exactly 1/2n), but, of course, this
sequence is computable, so it contains infinitely many finite and infinite correlations.
It is possible to transform a sequence Z = z1z2 · · · with no correlations and limiting
frequency of 0’s (and 1’s) exactly 1/2 into a sequence which has no infinite correlations, but
the limiting frequency of 0’s is 2/3 and the limiting frequency of 1’s is 1/3: replace in Z
every 0 by 001, and every 1 by 100. This new sequence will have “weak local correlations”
— for example 0010 has to be followed by 01 — but those correlations are not global.
We stress the fact that we are interested in “theoretical” sequences (2) produced by an
ideal quantum experiment generating randomness, not the specific results of a particular
quantum device like Quantis, [21]. Real devices are prone to real-world imperfections, even
watered-down by various unbiasing methods, see [17]; however, our results apply in the limit
to sequences generated by devices like Quantis (see [17, 22]).
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What is the degree of “randomness” of the resulting white noise sequence? Theoretically
there are a few possibilities, ranging from “total randomness” expressed mathematically by
saying that the sequence is algorithmically incompressible or algorithmically random,[20]
to weaker and weaker possibilities: Turing-uncomputable of various degrees, but not algo-
rithmically incompressible, Turing-computable, easy Turing-computable. Which of these
possibilities actually does occur?
II. MAIN RESULTS
A. Quantum value indefiniteness
In classical physics, omniscience manifests itself in the implicit assumption that it is
possible to know all physical properties, or to put it in the context of the Einstein, Podolsky
and Rosen argument [12], all “elements of physical reality” are definite. Classical realism
assumes that these definite physical properties exist without being experienced by any finite
mind [23], that it would not matter whether or not a particular physical observable is
measured or not; and that the outcome of any such measurement is independent of whatever
is measured alongside with it; that is, of its context. To state it pointedly: all classical
physical observables exist simultaneously and independent of observation.
Complementarity expresses the impossibility to measure two observables, such as the spin
states of two spin-1
2
particles along orthogonal directions, with arbitrary precision. But, as
equivalent [24] generalised urn [25] or automaton models [26] demonstrate, complementarity
does not necessarily imply value indefiniteness. There still could exist enough two-valued
states on the associated propositional structures to allow a faithful embedding into a Boolean
algebra associated with classical physical systems. Formally, value indefiniteness manifests
itself in the “scarcity” or non-existence of two-valued states –interpretable as classical truth
assignments – on all or even merely a finite set of physical observables. This is known as the
Kochen-Specker theorem [8] (for related results, see Refs. [27, 28, 29, 30, 31]). Very similar
conclusions can be drawn from the impossibility to enumerate tables of results associated
with Bell-type experiments in a consistent way: no such tables could possibly reproduce the
non-classical quantum correlations [32, 33, 34].
Confronted with the impossibility to consistently assign globally defined observables, one
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may assume, in an attempt to maintain realism, that the outcome of a particular experiment
depends on the other observables which are co-measured simultaneously (Bell [4], Sec. 5).
This assumption is called “context dependence.”
Alternatively, one may depart from classical omniscience and assume that an elementary
two-state system can carry at least a single bit, and nothing more. The context enters in
the form of the maximal operator, such that all other co-measurable operators are functions
thereof. If a particle can be prepared only to be in a single context, then the question quite
naturally arises why the measurement of a different context not matching the preparation
context yields any outcome at all. Pointedly stated, it is amazing that for non-matching
contexts there is an outcome rather than none. We note that only under these circumstances,
quantum randomness manifests itself, because if the preparation and the measurement con-
texts match, the measurement just renders the definite outcome associated with the state in
which the particle was prepared. In this non-contextual view, quantum value indefiniteness
expresses the fact that no deterministic, (pre-) defined non-contextual element of physical
reality could consistently exist for observables in contexts not matching the preparation con-
text. This is true also if we assume some form of “context translation” which may introduce
stochasticity through some mechanism of interaction with the measurement device.
B. From value indefiniteness to Turing-uncomputability
Thus, we conclude, no non-contextual, deterministic computation could exist which yields
such a measurement outcome. If one insists on some form of agent producing the outcome,
then this agent must perform like an erratic gambler rather than a faithful executor of a
deterministic algorithm.
Restated differently, suppose a quantum sequence hitherto considered would be com-
putable. In this case, the computations involved would produce a definite number associated
with a definite outcome, which in turn could be associated with a definite element of physical
reality. Yet we know that for Hilbert spaces of dimension greater than two, the assumption
of value definiteness of all possible observables results in a complete contradiction. Hence,
one is forced to conclude that the assumption of computability has to be given up, and hence
the sequence X in (2) is Turing-uncomputable.
Because the class of computable sequences is countable, with probability one (even, con-
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structively, with probability one, see [20]) every sequence is Turing-uncomputable. Our
result stated above is much stronger: no sequence X in (2) is Turing-computable. In partic-
ular, it says that any sequence X cannot contain only 0’s, it cannot represent in binary the
digits of the binary expansion of pi or the Champernowne sequence. More, no sequence X
can coincide with a pseudo-random sequence (i.e., sequence obtain via Turing machine pro-
gram), a fact alluded to almost 50 years ago by John von Neumann: “Anyone who considers
arithmetical methods of producing random digits is, of course, in a state of sin”.
C. White noise and algorithmic incompressibility
Uncomputability is a strong property, but it does not necessarily imply algorithmically
incompressibility. Is a sequence X more similar to the typical Turing-uncomputable sequence
given by the classification of Turing programs in halting or non-halting,
H = h1h2h3 · · ·hi · · · , (3)
or to the sequence of bits of a Chaitin Omega number, the halting probability:
Ω = ω1ω2ω3 · · ·ωi · · ·? (4)
The sequence H is defined by assigning to hi the value 1 if the ith Turing program (in
some systematic enumeration) halts, and the value 0 in the opposite case.
The sequence Ω is obtained by working with self-delimiting Turing machines (i.e. ma-
chines with prefix-free domains) by the formula:
Ω =
∑
p halts
2−|p|,
where |p| denotes the length (in bits) of the program p (see more in [20]).
Both H and Ω are Turing-uncomputable. The sequence H is Turing-uncomputable, but
it is also not algorithmic incompressible. A reason is the fact that we can effectively compute
infinitely many exact values of H by explicitly constructing infinitely many halting (or, non-
halting) programs. The sequence Ω is algorithmic incompressible. Both H and Ω can solve
the famous Halting Problem: we need the first 2n bits of H to solve the Halting Problem
for programs p of length |p| ≤ n, but we need no more than the first n bits of Ω to solve the
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same problem. The prefixes of Ω encode the same amount of information as the prefixes of
H , but in an exponentially more compressed way.
It is not difficult to see that the argument presented below to show that X is Turing-
uncomputable can be adapted to prove that every infinite sub-sequence of X is Turing-
uncomputable. More formally, there is no partially computable function ϕ defined on an
infinite set of positive integers such that if ϕ(n) is defined, then ϕ(n) = xn. This property
is called bi-immunity in the theory of computability, see Odiffredi [35].
This property is shared by Ω, but not by H .
D. Some consequences
We discuss some simple consequences of the above result.
First, no Turing machine can enumerate/compute any sub-sequence of X . This means
that every given Turing machine can compute only finitely many exact bits of X in the same
way that every given Turing machine can compute only finitely many exact bits of Ω (in
contrast with H). Similarly, any formal system (ZFC, for example) will be able to “prove”
only finitely many exact values of the sequence X .
Secondly, the sequence X is not predictable. The most clear intuition people have about
randomness is unpredictability: the bits of a “random” sequence should be such that one
cannot predict the next bit even if one knows all preceding bits. The simplest way to model
this phenomenon (see other models in [36]) is to consider predictions of the (n+1)th element
of the sequence when one knows the first n elements. The corresponding model is to accept
as predictor a partial computable function Pred defined on a subset of the prefixes of X
with 0-1 values. If Pred(w) = z and z = x|w|+1 we say that the bit z was predicted from
w. Does there exist a predictor Pred predicting infinitely many bits of X? The answer
is clearly negative: from Pred we can construct a partially computable function ϕ capable
of enumerating infinitely many values of X just by enumerating the domain of Pred and
each time we get Pred(w) = z and z = x|w|+1, then we put ϕ(|w|) = z. This leads to a
contradiction.
Thirdly, a more general result can be proved: there are no effective global (infinite) corre-
lations between the bits of X. One way to formalise this idea is to consider all possible prop-
erties between the prefixes of X that can be determined in an effective way. We can prove
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the following result: Every infinite relation of the form G = {(u, v) | uv is a prefix of X}
is not computably enumerable. Indeed, from G we can construct the partial function ϕ
as follows: to the pair (u, v) ∈ G, v = v1v2 · · · vm we associate the following values of ϕ:
ϕ(|u|+ i−1) = vi, i = 1, . . . , m. The function ϕ is correctly defined because of the condition
specified in the definition of G; it shows that one can effectively enumerate infinitely many
bits of X , a contradiction.
III. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
We have argued that, because of the value indefiniteness encountered in quantum me-
chanics, there cannot exist deterministic computations “yielding” infinitely many individual
quantum random bits. We have further exploited value indefiniteness formally by stating
the consequences in terms of Turing-uncomputability for sequences of such quantum random
bits. No effectively computable global correlations can exist between the bits of a quantum
random sequence.
We have also examined, in a theoretical manner, the role of the second axiom of quantum
randomness. The first axiom, stochasticity, seems more difficult to be studied from a purely
theoretical point of view — of course, it will be extremely interesting to have results in this
direction — but can be experimentally approached (for example, with the help of statistically
significant samples produced by Quantis).
Finally, we note that the result presented in this note says nothing about the possibility
of extracting quantum bits from the quantum source of randomness, which, one might hope,
could enhance the power of “real” computation. Some impossibility results in this direction
were proved in [37].
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